consciousness as involving "a fatal Error" that would "draw Reward and Punishment with it," and he claims that God's goodness could be expected to prevent the occurrence of such transfers if they were otherwise possible in the nature of things. It has seemed to many commentators that this section-which I will call "the Fatal Error Passage"-is utterly incompatible with Locke's own theory of personal identity. Hence, it seems that Locke, in this section, not only discusses but commits a "fatal error." I will argue, on the contrary, that the Fatal Error Passage is entirely consistent with Locke's theory of personal identity, properly understood. I will begin by explaining why commentators have frequently judged the Fatal Error Passage to be inconsistent with that theory, and I will set out four questions that any complete interpretation of the passage must answer. In preparation for answering them, I will describe some of Locke's key doctrines concerning four related topics: memory, identity, consciousness, and rewards and punishments. I will then explain briefly how these doctrines provide Locke with the resources to avoid both the common circularity objection concerning memory and the common inconsistency objection concerning the transitivity of identity. Next, I will examine two well-known interpretations that aim to acquit Locke of the charge of inconsistency in the Fatal Error Passage-one offered jointly by William P. Alston and Jonathan Bennett, and the other offered by Paul Helm-and I will argue that neither is successful. Finally, I will present what I believe is the correct interpretation of the Fatal Error Passage, answering the four questions about it that any complete interpretation must answer and giving a reading of the entire passage in the light of those answers-a reading that renders it consistent with Locke's treatment of personal identity. Although my central focus is thus on the interpretation of the Fatal Error Passage, the examination of Locke's theory of personal identity that is required in order to understand the passage will also serve to demonstrate the overall coherence and promise of that theory.
Personal Identity and the Apparent Contradiction of "Fatal Errors"
Personal Identity. Locke begins the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" with a general characterization of identity as a relation that holds between any thing considered "as existing at any determin'd time and place" and itself, even when existing "at another time" (Essay II.xxvii.1).
2 The leading idea of his approach to identity, however, is that "that which has made the Difficulty about this Relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attributed" (Essay II.xxvii.1), and so he quickly turns to the application of that relation to particular kinds of things, as these are determined by particular ideas. After discussing the application of identity to God, finite spirits, particles of matter, compound masses of matter, living creatures, and machines, he draws a crucial distinction between the idea of man and the idea of person. A man is a member of the human species (i.e., a living human animal) that may, but in principle need not, be rational; a person, in contrast, is a rational being that may, but in principle need not, be human.
(Because of its centrality to his chapter, I will simply follow Locke's technical usage of these terms, even though it has the counterintuitive consequence that women are properly describable as "female men.") Drawing on his previous discussions of finite spirits and bodies, he also distinguishes, from both men and persons, the particular substanceswhether immaterial or material-that actually perform the thinking in men, persons, and other thinking beings.
These distinctions allow Locke to extend specifically to persons his general methodological principle that "to conceive, or judge of [identity] aright, we must consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for; … for such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, such must be the Identity" [Essay II.xxvii.7] . In pursuance of this approach, he analyzes what it is to be a person, asserting that to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from 2 He also writes, "In this consists Identity, when the Ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence" (Essay II.xxvii.1). By this he apparently means that the idea of identity is formed by comparing an idea of a thing as it is at one time with an idea of a thing as it is at the same or another time, but where each state is conceived as a temporal stage of the same enduring thing. This is in accordance with Locke's general account of the origins of ideas of relations: all such ideas involve comparing two or more ideas without combining them (Essay II.xii.7 and II.xxv).
thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls self: It not being considered in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same, or diverse Substances. (Essay II.xxvii.9) 3
From this account of personhood as constituted by reason, reflection, and conscious consideration of self at different times and places, he concludes that the temporal extent of a person is determined by consciousness of the past:
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done. (Essay II.xxvii.9)
The Apparent Contradiction of "Fatal Errors." After giving this general account of personal identity, Locke returns more specifically to the relation between the identity or diversity of thinking substances and the identity or diversity of the persons in which they think. In Section 12, he poses a two-part question: "whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons." Section 13 constitutes Locke's answer to the first part of the question, but it also includes a lengthy and puzzling digression concerning "transfer" of consciousness and "fatal errors." The entire section reads as follows:
3 By Locke's usual standards for the use of the term 'substance', men (and presumably persons) also qualify as substances (Essay II.xii.6). However, in his discussion of personal identity, he consistently uses the term 'substance' (and related terms such as 'same substance') more restrictedly, to refer more specifically to the substances that compose or help to compose men or persons. While allowing that God has the power to make material substances think, Locke grants that it is "the more probable opinion" (Essay II.xxvii.25) that human thought is performed by an immaterial substance (i.e., a "finite spirit" or "soul"). He conceives of such immaterial substances, on the model of material corpuscles, as spatially located entities persisting through time; unlike material substances, however, they are not extended. See Alston and Bennett 1988 In a similar vein, J. L. Mackie (1975) remarks that Locke's appeal to God will not do … for it presupposes that there is something else which really constitutes personal identity, which is the true bearer of responsibility, and which therefore needs to be protected from the unjust effects of a transfer of Thus it appears that, in addressing the question of whether a person can survive a change in thinking substance, Locke recognizes at the outset of the Fatal Error Passage that his own theory of personal identity entails that a person would be identical with an earlier person having a different thinking substance just as long as the later person had "consciousness" of the actions of that earlier person. However, Locke next appears to worry 4 Flew continues: By making this desperate appeal, Locke both tacitly confesses the inadequacy of his own account of personal identity and provides one more example of a phenomenon already all too familiar to the student of religious apologetic-the hope that the sheer physical power of a postulated God can make contradictions consistent or by itself make utterances to which no sense has been given sensible. 5 Mackie continues, "The actions of which someone thus becomes directly conscious would be as much his as anyone's past actions are in any normal case. As Locke has insisted, it would not, on his theory, matter at all if these actions had been done by a different man or by a different spiritual substance." More recently, Kenneth Winkler, while showing more sympathy for Locke than does either Flew or Mackie, has allowed that " Flew's objection [to the Fatal Error Passage] shows that the dominant themes in chapter xxvii-the subjective constitution of the self, and the possibility of objective criticism and adjustment-cannot easily be combined" (Winker 1991: 170) . "Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and 'Fatal Errors'" Don Garrett that a later person having such consciousness but lacking the same thinking substance would be committing a "fatal error," evidently on the grounds that that later person would not, after all, be the same person as the earlier agent. Yet after invoking God's goodness as a reason to expect that the kind of fatal error in question would not in fact occur, Locke then returns at the end of the passage, with seemingly remarkable good cheer, to answer his original question in the affirmative-re-affirming the seemingly-just-abandoned claim that persons would survive a change of thinking substance if the same consciousness were preservedand to re-endorse the original theory of personal identity that entailed it. Even for a philosopher sometimes thought to be inattentive to consistency, such a performance of the general form "p; although q, because not-p; but to return to the question, p" within a single paragraph would be truly breathtaking.
Is this indeed what Locke is doing? In order to answer this question, we must determine the answers to the following four questions, each of which must be addressed by any complete interpretation of the Fatal Error Passage:
1. What is a "transfer of consciousness?" 2. What is the "fatal error" that a transfer of consciousness does or might involve? 3. How would such a fatal error "draw reward and punishment with it?" 4. Why would God's goodness lead Him to prevent the occurrence of such errors?
Some Key Lockean Doctrines
In order to see how Locke would answer these questions, it is essential to examine some of his key doctrines on the topics of memory, identity, consciousness, and rewards and punishments.
Memory. Locke presents his theory of memory in the chapter of the Essay entitled "Of Retention" (Essay II.x). He defines Retention as the "keeping of those simple Ideas, which from Sensation or Reflection [the mind] hath received." One species of retention is contemplation, by which the mind keeps "the Idea, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view"; the other species of retention is memory, defined as "the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas, which from Sensation and Reflection it hath received" (Essay II.x.1). Thus, Locke imposes, by definition, the Revival in Self Requirement on Memory: Memory requires the revival of a perception that one has oneself actually had in the past.
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He repeats and emphasizes this requirement several times in the course of the chapter (see especially Essay II.x.2,7). He also emphasizes repeatedly (Essay II.x.2-8) that this requirement is compatible with his doctrine that ideas cannot exist unperceived; for although the ideas themselves do not exist when unperceived, the power to revive them may nevertheless do so. This power may be explained through the operation of "organs" related to memory (see especially Essay II.xxvii.29) that allow the "laying up" and "rouzing" of material or immaterial traces (Essay II.5-7).
Immediately after the definition just cited, Locke characterizes memory more fully as "a Power … [of the mind] to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before" (Essay II.x.2; boldface added for emphasis). Thus, he also holds the Self-Representation Requirement on Memory: In memory, one not only has a perception, but also represents that this perception was had by oneself in the past. 6 Because the publication of the chapter "Of Retention" in the first edition of the Essay predates by several years Locke's treatment of the self in the later chapter "Of Identity and Diversity," it is not surprising that he writes of "the mind's" revival of a perception that "it" has had before. However, given his repeated allowance in the later chapter that persons remember their earlier perceptions despite possible changes of thinking of substance, there can be little doubt that by 'the mind' and 'it' in this context he means what he later characterizes as the 'self'-i.e., the conscious thinking person, rather than any particular thinking substance.
Identity. As previously noted, Locke characterizes identity as a relation holding between any thing considered "as existing at any determin'd time and place" and itself, even when existing "at another time"; and as this implies, he holds that all of the things to which identity applies exist in both time and place (Essay II.xxvii.1-2). Spatio-temporal location thus pertains not only to simple and compound "bodies" of various kinds, but also to God (who is everywhere at all times), to "finite intelligences" (which exist in a definite place even if they are immaterial and unextended-see also Essay II.xxiii. 20) , and even to the modes and relations of all these kinds of substances (for modes and relations are located in the same places as the substances whose modes or relations they are-see Essay II.xxvii.2,28). The universality of spatio-temporal location is important to Locke because it plays a crucial role in individuation:
For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to some thing that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. (Essay II.xxvii.1; boldface added for emphasis)
As the final sentence indicates, he accepts the
Uniqueness of Location:
No place can be occupied by more than one thing of any given kind at a time, and no thing can have two different places at a single time.
The Uniqueness of Location shows, according to Locke, how "Existence itself" is the "principium individuationis" that serves to distinguish items of the same kind from one another by "determin[ing] a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind" (Essay II.xxvii.3). Things of different kinds, however-for example, the omnipresent deity and a body, or (presumably) a man and a person-may occupy the same place at the same time without violating this principle.
Just as location plays a central role in individuation at a time, continuity plays a central role in identity through time. Locke first cites the example of an Atom … existing in a determined time and place: … it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its Existence is continued: for so long it will be the same, and no other. (Essay II.xxvii.3; boldface added for emphasis) Again, he writes that a plant's identity lies in that particular concrete existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts. (Essay II.xxvii.4; boldface added for emphasis; see also Essay II.xxvii.6 for the application of this point to men and II.xxvii.25 for a reference to the "self" or "same consciousness" as "continued for the future").
At the conclusion of the chapter, he makes the point completely universal:
[W]hatever be the composition whereof the complex Idea is made, whenever Existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same Existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination. (Essay II.xxvii.29; boldface added for emphasis) This is in keeping with his primary strategy, noted previously, of deriving the specific conditions for the identity of things of particular kinds directly from the ideas of those kinds.
Thus, Locke endorses the

Sufficiency of Continued Existence for Identity:
Given the existence of a thing of a particular kind, the continued existence of something satisfying the conditions determined by the idea of that kind of thing is sufficient for identity between the original thing and the continuing thing. Consciousness. Locke defines consciousness in the first chapter of Book II, entitled "Of Ideas in General," as "the perception of what passes in a Man's own mind" (Essay II.i.19).
However, most of his remarks about this kind of perception occur in the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity," and especially in Sections 9-14. There he characterizes consciousness more explicitly as "perceiving [that] one does perceive" and asserts firmly that consciousness so defined is "inseparable from thinking, and … essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive" (Essay II.xxvii.9).
8 Consciousness is able to play an essential role in personal identity for Locke precisely because it is an act of perception whose content is not merely that some particular thing is perceived but also that that particular thing is perceived by oneself-i.e., because Locke accepts the
Self-Representation Requirement on Consciousness:
Consciousness always represents a perception as being perceived by oneself.
By its nature, consciousness provides both the origin of, and the basis for applying, the very idea of self; and this is what Locke means when he writes of consciousness that "by this every one is to himself, that which he calls self ….
[C]onsciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self" (Essay II.xxvii.9, boldface added for emphasis).
Crucially, then, memory (in virtue of the Self-Representation Requirement on Memory)
and consciousness (in virtue of the Self-Representation Requirement on Consciousness) previous moment, without spatial "jumps"). In addition, it leaves open the question of whether continued existence (however understood) is also a necessary condition for identity. While it may be possible to settle some or all of these questions of interpretation, doing so is not required for present purposes. 8 This characterization of consciousness as a perceiving-that-one-perceives that is inseparable from thinking and perception does not entail that the perception of one's act of perception must itself be accompanied by a further perception (i.e., a perception that one is perceiving that one is perceiving), which would threaten an infinite regress. It should be noted that, while Locke characterizes consciousness as inseparable from all perception and from all thought, he does distinguish thought from mere perception: "bare" perception is the ("for the most part") passive having of ideas, whereas thinking is the having of ideas with "some degree of voluntary attention" (Essay II.ix.1). His thesis of the inseparability of consciousness from perception and thinking appears to commit him to the view that higher non-human animals are likely to be conscious, for he freely grants that such animals as "dogs and elephants" give "every demonstration [of thinking] imaginable, except only telling us that they do so" (Essay II.1.19). Nevertheless, Locke can still deny that all higher animals are persons, since he also requires that persons be rational (Essay II.xxvii.8-9), and he denies that any actual non-human animals have a significant endowment of reason (Essay IV.xvii.1).
each include a representation of the self as part of their content: the former representing the self as having perceived in the past, the latter representing the self as perceiving in the present. But since all perception is conscious, every act of memory is inseparable from an act of consciously remembering; and an act of consciously remembering will contain more than one representation of self (or at least, more than one use of the same representation of self). Because memory always represents oneself as having previously had a certain perception in the past, the consciousness that accompanies memory will always represent oneself as currently perceiving both that an earlier perception occurred and that that perception was perceived by oneself. 9 When a complex representation of this kind occurs, one ipso facto represents oneself (i.e., one's present self) as being the same self as the self that perceived an earlier perception or (because voluntary actions are themselves perceived)
performed an earlier action. The present self thereby appropriates the self who was conscious of the earlier perception or action as its self-i.e., as the same self that has the present consciousness. In doing so, the present self appropriates the perceptions and actions of the earlier self as well (Essay II.xxvii.25-26), considering itself-as Locke puts it in his definition of personhood-"as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places."
At least when it occurs in genuine memory, Locke holds, such a past-appropriating consciousness allows a rational, reflective being to "repeat" an earlier act of perception with what may properly be called "the same consciousness"; 10 and this sameness of consciousness is sufficient for the earlier and the later person actually to be the same person:
9 It may be noted that if the memory of a past perception content also happens to include memory of the consciousness that accompanied that content in the past (i.e., if the memory now represents not only that the content was perceived by the self in the past, but also represents that the content was consciously perceived by the self in the past), then the present act of memory will also contain a third representation of self (or at least will make a further use of an existing representation of self). 10 As I am using the term 'appropriation', it requires only a representation that a perception or action was, is, or will be had or performed by oneself-i.e., by the self that one now is. Such a representation need not be veridical, for it may be (as we shall later have occasion to see) a misrepresentation, on Locke's view. A representation of a perception or action as had or performed by oneself will be veridical, however, whenever it constitutes a genuine memory and hence occurs within the same consciousness. At Essay II.xxvii.10, Locke alludes to a possibility that there may be "thought" in sleep without "that consciousness, which remarks our waking Thoughts." This should not be understood as a claim that thought consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done.
Rewards and Punishments.
Locke's primary discussion of rewards and punishments occurs in the chapter of the Essay entitled "Of other Relations" (Essay II.xxviii). There he defines reward and punishment as "Pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker" (Essay II.xxviii.6). As this definition indicates, rewards and punishments must be actual pleasures or pains that result from (at least supposed) obedience to or violation of a law. Locke distinguishes three kinds of laws, which differ from one another both through their particular lawmakers and through their characteristic sanctions of pleasure and pain. The divine law, establishing "sins and duties,"
is made by God and results in pains or pleasures in the afterlife. The civil law, establishing "criminal" and "innocent," is made by the commonwealth, and results in the forfeiture or retention of life, liberty, or goods in the present life. Finally, the law of opinion or reputation, establishing "vice" and "virtue," is made by societies of human beings, and results in the pain of "disgrace" or the pleasure of "credit."
In the chapter "Of other Relations," Locke writes of laws, rewards, and punishments as applying simply to "Men"; this is not surprising, for the chapter antedates by several years the explicit development of the distinction between the concepts of man and person involved in Locke's writing of the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" for the second edition of the Essay. In "Of Identity and Diversity, however, Locke expressly clarifies the basis for the appropriate application of law, reward, and punishment, writing that "in this personal identity, is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to, or affected with that consciousness." (Essay II.xxvii.18).
Personal identity can provide a proper basis for rewards and punishments, in Locke's view, because the past-directed relation of appropriation is paralleled by a similar but futuredirected relation: one feels self-interested concern (i.e., "there is some thing that is himself that he is concerned for and would have happy") when one represents, with present consciousness of oneself doing so, perceptions and actions as being perceived and performed in the future by oneself-a future self that can, in turn, appropriate one's present 
Circularity Concerning Memory and Inconsistency Concerning Transitivity
These key doctrines provide Locke with the basic resources needed to avoid two wellknown objections to his theory of personal identity: the objection that it is circular in its use of memory and the objection that it is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity. 12 Locke does allow that, because of the difficulty of proving consciousness of particular deeds, human courts may sometimes have to punish "with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge" even in the absence of consciousness of the deed punished (Essay II.xxvii.22). identity, it cannot be used to explain it. Thus, memory in the first sense ("phenomenal memory" or "seeming memory") is by itself too weak to play the central role in an account personal identity, while memory in the second sense ("genuine memory" or "veridical memory") is sufficiently strong to yield the right results but only at the cost of circularity, allowing us to analyze personal identity only in terms of a concept of memory that must itself be analyzed in terms of a prior concept of personal identity.
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In fact, however, Locke's account of memory provides him with an avenue to avoid this dilemma. On the one hand, Lockean memory is not too weak to guarantee personal identity. Of course, Locke's requirement that memory be of a perception that one has oneself had in the past threatens circularity-the other horn of the dilemma-unless it can be spelled out in terms that do not presuppose personal identity. However, the concept of an idea's revival through causal traces in a way that involves a dual representation of self (first as having perceived an earlier perception or action and second as presently perceiving that it so perceived) offers at least a basis for such an account. Locke could refine the account by further specifying the causal requirements for revival, by stipulating additional requirements for memory in addition to revival, or both. To be sure, he does not actually develop such an account; and the difficulties of doing so are many. Furthermore, since he regards memory as sufficient for sameness of consciousness, and sameness of consciousness as sufficient for personal identity, he must take care that his account of memory not allow for memory "fission" cases (in which the perceptions or actions of a single person are remembered by two distinct persons) or memory "fusion" cases (in which the perceptions or actions of two distinct persons are both remembered by a single person), on pain of violating the Uniqueness of Location. Nevertheless, the strategy of refining or supplementing revival as a requirement for memory offers the prospect of a middle course between a conception of memory that is too weak and a conception of memory that could not be invoked without circularity.
Because of the
Inconsistency Concerning Transitivity. It is often objected that Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity-i.e., with the principle that if X is identical with Y and Y is identical with Z, then X is identical with Z. The best-known version of this objection is Thomas
Reid's discussion of the example of a "Brave Officer."
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In the example, a young boy is flogged for robbing an orchard; the boy then grows into a brave officer, who takes the enemy's standard in battle while still remembering the flogging; and the officer then becomes, in advanced age, a general who remembers taking the enemy's standard but can no longer remember the flogging. Reid interprets Locke's claims about conscious appropriation as entailing that a person P 2 , existing at time t 2 , is identical with a person P 1 existing at an earlier time t 1 , if and only if P 2 can remember at t 2 the action or perception of P 1 at t 1 . On this interpretation, the general is identical with the brave officer, and the officer is identical with the boy, but the general is not identical with the boy. Yet by the transitivity of identity, if the general is identical with the officer and the officer is identical with the boy, then the general is identical with the boy. It follows, then, that the general both is and is not identical with the boy; and Locke is thereby caught in a contradiction.
It is sometimes proposed that Locke could avoid this contradiction simply by rejecting the transitivity of identity, at least in its application to persons. But while this would prevent the derivation of the contradiction in question, it would not constitute a remedy acceptable to Locke. For if the general and the boy are each identical with the brave officer, then it follows that both occupy whatever time and place the brave officer occupies; and if the general and the boy are nevertheless not identical with each other, then they will constitute two different things of the same kind (namely, persons) occupying the same place at the same time-contrary to the Uniqueness of Location.
Locke can avoid the objection, not by rejecting the transitivity of identity, but rather by rejecting the view that a person P 2 , existing at time t 2 , is identical with a person P 1 existing at an earlier time t 1 only if P 2 can remember at t 2 the action or perception of P 1 at t 1 . It is true, for Locke, that one will find oneself appropriating an earlier action or perception if and only if one represents it as done or perceived by oneself-typically, and most forcibly, by remembering it. In addition, he evidently holds that one is justly rewarded or punished for an act only if one is actually appropriating it at the time of reward or punishment. But although Locke implies that personal identity reaches only as far as it can "be extended" or can "reach" by consciousness (e.g., Essay II.xxvii.9-10, 14, 23), he does not say that the extension by consciousness of a present person into the past is always limited to what the present person now remembers or even can now actually remember. On the contrary, following an extended discussion of the "reach" of consciousness, he concludes that to be conscious of "any of the Actions of Nestor" is to "find" oneself to be "the same Person with Nestor" (Essay II.xxvii.14; boldface added for emphasis)-which is much more than finding merely one single and discrete act of Nestor's also to be an act of one's own. This
conclusion is just what one should expect, for to become conscious of an action of Nestor's is, on Locke's account, to become convinced that one is the same self as Nestor and ipso facto to become prepared to represent any of the actions of Nestor's self-properly incorporated into Nestor's self at whatever time and by whatever means-as actions performed by one's own self; and this must include even actions that Nestor once remembered but that one cannot now specifically remember. If one cannot at present remember an action (i.e., cannot revive the perception of its performance with the representation that it was performed by self) but is at present convinced by external evidence that one is nevertheless the same self that performed it, then one will necessarily represent it as performed by oneself, but with somewhat less immediate force and conviction than is present in memory. Such a difference would be comparable to that between the forcible conviction of seeing a tree and merely having an opinion, based on other evidence, that a tree exists. Like the opinion that an unseen tree exists, the opinion that a now-forgotten perception or action genuinely belongs to oneself (because genuinely belonging to an earlier person who is oneself) may well be true.
That Locke actually holds this general doctrine-i.e., the doctrine that conscious memory of an earlier perception or action also extends the history of the person to whatever other perceptions or actions are implicated in sameness of consciousness with that earlier perception or action, regardless of present ability to remember them-is strongly suggested by his pointed limitation of the two cases he discusses in which personal identity fails despite identity of thinking substance or man. The first such case is that of total permanent erasure of traces:
As to the … question, "whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons?" which question seems to me to be built on this, whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again; and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state. (Essay II.xxvii.14; boldface added for emphasis)
The second is that of alternating but entirely distinct and incommunicable consciousnesses:
Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night … I ask … whether the day and the night man would not be two as distinct persons, as Socrates and 1. A "transfer of consciousness" will consist of any case in which one thinking substance seems to remember a perception or action actually perceived or performed by another thinking substance.
2. The "fatal error" involved will lie in one thinking substance believing that it has performed an action that was in fact performed not by that thinking substance, but by another thinking substance. Nevertheless, there are two serious objections to this interpretation. The first is that it conflicts with Locke's doctrine of the Forensic Uniqueness of Personality, according to which personal identity is the only kind of identity necessary for the just application of rewards and punishments. As we have already observed, Locke states explicitly that "all the right and justice of reward and punishment" is "founded on personal identity" (Essay 16 One might also see an entirely different kind of injustice, one to the person, in punishment that occurs after a change of thinking substance-not punishment of the wrong person, but punishment of the person for faults of character that he or she might no longer possess. For a change of thinking substance might well involve acquiring a thinking substance more disposed to virtue, or to the habits of mind (such as calm deliberation prior to acting on one's present desires) that Locke thinks are conducive to virtue. However, Locke shows no evidence of being concerned about issues of this kind. Indeed, his previously-noted emphasis on the motivating power of self-interested concern and reciprocal conscious acts of action-appropriation as the basis for just reward and punishment makes little obvious room for such considerations. The second objection is that the Alston-Bennett interpretation cannot make sense of Locke's description of the process that produces the "fatal error," given his acceptance of Again, he writes of persons (and also, in chapters of earlier composition, of men) as "Agents," but he nowhere writes of thinking substances themselves as "Agents." In suggesting that a thinking substance might represent something as being done by "it self"
that was in fact done by "some other Agent," Locke can only be raising the prospect that it represents as done by its own present self or person what was in fact done by some other self or person. This-and not an attribution to the wrong thinking substance-must be the "fatal error" in question. I conclude that the Alston-Bennett interpretation, while ingenious and initially appealing, is ultimately unsuccessful. something that that person did not actually do-because it was not done by any consciousness that is spatio-temporally continuous with the person, but was instead done by some other person.
Persons as
Helm, too, provides answers on Locke's behalf to each of our four questions about the Fatal Error Passage:
1. A "transfer of consciousness" will consist in any case in which one person/thinking substance seems to remember having performed an action that was in fact performed by some other person/thinking substance.
2. The "fatal error" involved will lie in one person/thinking substance believing that it has performed an action that was in fact performed not by it, but by another person/thinking substance.
3. This error will "draw reward and punishment with it" because "human courts sometimes punish," erroneously, on the basis of "false memories."
4. God's goodness would prevent such fatal errors from occurring because it would be unjust for one person/thinking substance to be punished (or rewarded) "on the grounds provided by a misremembering" (177) 
Sufficiency of Sameness of Consciousness for Personal Identity-indeed, it offers a
necessary condition of at least some prima facie plausibility for "sameness of consciousness" in terms of (spatio-temporally) continued existence.
Nevertheless, Helm's interpretation is also subject to two objections. The first is that its answer to the third question, concerning the drawing of rewards and punishments, seems insufficient. Because a just God would surely not reward or punish a person for the deeds of some other person, Helms allows that a "fatal error" of the kind he describes would not draw any divine "reward and punishment" with it. In an attempt to find rewards and punishments that would follow such a "fatal error," he points to the fact that criminal courts (i.e., courts of what Locke calls "civil law," establishing "criminal and innocent") are sometimes led to punish unjustly-for example, as a result of a false confession-through failure to recognize the falsity of a defendant's phenomenal memory. Yet the prevention of such criminal punishments as these seems no more central to God's concerns than does the prevention of unjust punishments based on the dishonest testimony of others-something that Locke does not describe God as taking any special care to prevent. Preventing unjust rewards in criminal courts resulting from false phenomenal memory seems an even more unlikely aim of special divine intervention. Moreover, such rewards would rarely be so great as to constitute matters in which "the Happiness or Misery of any of [God's] conserves personal identity. Of course, a "transfer of consciousness" will conserve personal identity if the "transfer" is an instance of genuine memory. For in that case, the later consciousness will represent (in accordance with the Self-Representation Requirement on
Consciousness and the Self-Representation Requirement on Memory) that it is itself "perceiving something that was previously perceived by itself," and (by the Revival in Self Requirement on Memory) this perception will occur as the result of a process of reviving an idea that was in fact previously perceived by that same self or person. Of course, whether or not there can actually be genuine memory of perceptions that were originally perceived by another thinking substance depends-as Locke himself insists-on the unknown mechanisms by which thinking things might acquire, retain, or transfer their powers to revive perceptions. Here, however, is the outline of one obvious explanation of how such personal-identity-preserving transfers could occur: Memory traces may be stored in a brain that is in causal interaction with whichever immaterial thinking substance is currently doing the thinking in a given man. The replacement of one immaterial thinking substance by another might then allow the new immaterial thinking substance to take on the role of the earlier substance in the same continued individual consciousness-including in this role its ability to access some or all of these stored memory traces. The new thinking substance would thereby acquire the power once possessed by the previous thinking substance to "revive" or "renew" certain ideas as memories.
Turning to the second question, what then is the "fatal error" that might infect some transfers of consciousness? In the course of addressing the question of whether persons can survive a change of thinking substance, Locke is naturally brought to address the more general question of how "transfers of consciousness" might occur and to recognize that, while some such transfers may preserve personal identity, others may not. A "fatal error" is an error because it involves a transfer of consciousness of the kind that does not preserve personal identity-that is, it always involves a false and merely phenomenal or seeming "memory" of an action that was in actuality performed only by another person or self. Like the conscious perception of a genuine memory, the perception involved in such an error is an act having the content: "I myself am (currently) perceiving that an earlier perception or action was perceived and that that thought or action was perceived by myself." Unlike the case of consciousness of a genuine memory, however, the earlier perception or action in the case of a "fatal error" was in fact perceived by some other person-and so not by any previous self sharing sameness of consciousness with the present self having the seeming Finally, we can see why Locke should suppose that divine goodness would require that God forestall such fatal errors, were they otherwise to be possible in the nature of thinking substances. For although a just God would not wish to bestow eternal rewards and punishments on persons for actions they had not performed, the psychology of action appropriation itself guarantees that these errors will produce unjustly rewarding or punitive 18 In this respect, the indubitable force of memory might be compared with the force of the sensation of searing heat that Locke describes as rendering indubitable the sensory judgment that one's hand is in a real glass furnace (Essay IV.xi.8).
states of mind in a person's consciousness. Furthermore, should these states of mind occur on or after the Great Day of Judgment, they would be of just the kind-namely, pleasures and pains in the afterlife-specified for obedience to and violation of the divine law, even though they would not be received for real obedience or violation of those laws. Moreover, because such rewarding or punitive states of mind at the Day of Judgment are likely to be central to one's thought for all eternity, they bear directly on "Happiness and Misery," in Locke's technical senses of those terms. God would therefore be especially concerned to prevent "fatal" errors of this kind, for they would threaten to make the most damaging mockery possible of divine law. I grant, were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could not:
But it being but a present representation of a past Action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn.
This general possibility of false representation, in turn, raises yet a further and more specific question-namely, whether a thinking thing might falsely represent itself (i.e., its self) as having perceived, not just something that it did not actually perceive, but something that another self did happen actually to perceive. Because consciousness is a perception of oneself as perceiving, it is a "reflex" act of perception, and one that he has earlier claimed (Essay II.xxvii.9) is inseparable from perceiving; hence, the possibility of one person or agent representing itself as having perceived or done something that was actually perceived or done only by another self likewise depends on the nature of the processes underlying this particular kind of reflexive perception. In fact, in the absence of specific knowledge about these processes, it must be allowed as possible that a thinking substance may represent to itself as done by itself (i.e., by the self that it represents itself to be) an action that was not performed by the same individual self which its thought helps to constitute, and was instead performed by another person. Such an occurrence would, in itself, be no more surprising than the false representations of the external world that occur in dreams (which also sometimes involve representing oneself as doing what happens actually to be perceived or done only be someone else). So he continues:
And therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent, why I say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of Matter of Fact, as well as several representations in Dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the Nature of things.
A misrepresentation of this kind would involve a person in misappropriating (i.e., erroneously treating as one's own) an earlier act that he or she did not in fact perform.
Hence, if the act in question were contrary to the law of vice and virtue, the person would incur at least the unjust punishment of self-disgrace. Such an unjust state of affairs, at least as it would affect one's ultimate fate in the afterlife, is something that God could be expected to prevent, a reflection that leads Locke to write:
And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances, be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another, that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it.
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Up to this point in the Fatal Error Passage, Locke has written in accordance with his initial assumption that perception and thinking in humans are performed by immaterial 19 Locke's use of the phrase 'that it never is so' is rather surprising, for erroneous transfers of consciousness do occur occasionally in earthly life, and even with punitive or rewarding psychological consequences. Nevertheless, Locke's failure to acknowledge such cases parallels his consistent failure to acknowledge, in his discussions of knowledge by sensation (Essay IV.xi), the existence of actual sensory illusions and hallucinations (outside of the special case of dreams). Indeed, he connects his optimism about the actual reliability of memory with his optimism about the actual reliability of the senses in Essay IV.xi.11: As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exist, so by our memory we may be assured that previously things that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things, of which our senses having informed us, our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. Worries about the actual occurrence of false phenomenal sense experiences and the actual occurrence of false phenomenal memory experiences are both entirely absent from this passage. In any case, however, the later phrase 'as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned in it' has the effect of limiting the scope of Locke's claim-or at least his interest-in the Fatal Error Passage to the cases of "utmost Pleasure" and "utmost Pain" involved in eternal rewards and punishments.
substances. He now reflects that erroneous transfers of consciousness might pose an even greater problem if thinking were instead performed by material substances:
How far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered.
It is indeed more difficult to explain how an alleged resurrection of the person with a new body would avoid fatal errors on this materialist alternative. Locke remarks in Essay II.xxvii.15 that "we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it." But in the absence of an immaterial thinking soul-substance to endure from death to resurrection, the traces underlying genuine memory must presumably be somehow lodged in an arrangement of material substances-despite the disintegration of the person's human body. Substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd. [Essay II.xvii.13] This is exactly what Locke should say; for unlike those erroneous transfers of consciousness involved in fatal errors, a transfer of the same consciousness preserves personal identity by preserving the same person through time. Thus, Locke's positive answer to his original question is entirely consistent with his discussion of the possibility that some potential transfers of consciousness-namely, those that would not transfer the same consciousnesswould constitute "fatal errors" drawing rewards and punishments with them in a way that a good God would be likely to prevent.
